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NORFOLK CITY CODE 
Sec. 31-17. Disorderly conduct-- Generally. 
Any person who shall, within the limits of the city, 
be guilty of disorderly conduct, other than that set 
fo+th in other sections of this Code, shall, upon 
conviction thereof, be fined not less than one dollar 
nor more than five hundred dollars, or be confined in 
jail not exceeding six months, either or both. (Code 
1950, § 29-12.) 
1 
ARREST\\ .tRANT FOR VIOLATION OF CITY l JINANCE 
(Rule 3A:4) 
---==================================================================== 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 
CITY OF NORFOLK,_ to-wit: 
To any of the Police Officers of the City of Norfolk or any other authorized officer: 
You are hereby commanded in the name of the Commonwealth forthwith to arrest----------
James G. Stanl ay . · 
(Name of accused, or a description by which the accused can be identified) 
Norfolk General District Court, Criminal Division ---·-------------:--:=-=------=~ 
to answer a charge that he (she) committed an offense in the City of Norfolk on or about --"-5_-_1-'9,__ ___ , 19 _7_6_, 
namely Violate Section Jl-17 i1ity Code To-witt D1 sorrlerl 1 Conduct: 
Time 7:00 P.M. 
_____ P~lAGa~c~e~ouf~ouc~cu~rra~~n~c~e~J~O~O~B-l~k~.~~~•a•Bu~~t~e~S~t~--------------------~~-------(1) 
On the basis of the sworn statement(s) of ___ ...JWwAal....._..t~erw.· ......,~B"" • ._..M..,a.r ..._..t ... i ... nL....ojl ... l,.,.l __ _,6..,2u7L..::-::...5£12,._9.,.l ____ _ 
the undersigned has found probable cause to Address ___.3~~~~:.4~9--'-"lfl_,.-=Bc:u:.:::tc..:e:-...::S:..::t:...:.•:.:.;A~p:...::t"'"".<.::;,.;o_' --'C=-------
believe the accused has committed the offense (2) Dated: May 19 th J 19_1Q__ 
I L--------------------' 
(Magistrate) 
The complaint has been attached to the original of this warrant. (3) 
(1) Give a brief description of the offense, e.g., the murder of John Doe. 
(2) If the warrant issues because the accused failed to appear in response to a summons, this paragraph should 
read substantialy as follows: The accused failed to appear before the ---------------
on , 19 __ in response to a summons issued , 19 --· 
(3) If a written complaint has ~een made, it should be stapled or otherwise attached to the original of the war-
rant. If no written complaint has been made, the reference thereto should be lined out. 
THE WITHIN NAMED defendant on this ---- day of-----------· 19 __ forfeited 
(nolo contendere) 
(guilty) 
collateral in the amount of$ _______ ; was brought before me and -pleaded (not guilty); upon hearing was 
(guilty) 
found by me (not guilty); and I adjudge a fine of $'~'-_____ _..and costs of$-----· and----· days 
in jail suspended on condition -------------------------------
City Attorney Present -------------- Trial in Absence ------------· 
Attorney for Defendant Present License Suspended . days/months 
On motion of said defendant an appeal is granted to the next term of the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, 
to-wit, the first Wednesday in , 19_and he witnesses above named were severally duly recognized 
each in the sum of One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars. payable to the Commonwealth of Virginia, for their appearance 
before said Court to give evidence on said charge, and to depart hence without leave of said court. 
Given under my hand this------- day of _____ _, 19_ 
Judge 
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VIRGI~IA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
CITY OF NORFOLK 1 
Plaintiff 
vs. CR. APP. HO. 
--------
JAMES G. STANLEY I 
Defendant 
HOTION TO QUASH 
COMES Nm\1 the Defendant, James G. Stanley, and 
respectfully moves to quash the warrant sworn out against him on 
May 19, 1976, charging him with violation ot' Section 31-17 of the 
City Code of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, on the grounds that 
said section of said City Code violates the 5th and 14th 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of A~erica. 
Beril M. Abraham, p.d. 
401 Plaza One Building 
Norfolk, Virginia 23510 
JAMES G. STANLEY 
By _______ ~~~---~--~--~ 
Of Counsel 
CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that a true copy of the foregoing 
Hotion to Quash was mailed this 2nd day of June, 1976, to Lawrence 
Lawless, Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Norfolk 
Virginia, Office of the Commonwealth Attorney, City Hall Avenue, 
Norfolk, Virginia 23510, and to Philip R. Trapani, City Attorney 
for the City of Norfolk, City Attorney's Office, City Hall 
Building, Norfolk, Virginia 23510. 
VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
ON THE 21st DAY OF JUNE, IN THE YEAR 1976. 
CITY OF NORFOLK 
v. 
JAMES G. STANLEY 
0 R DE R 
This cause came on this day to be heard on the motion 
of the defendant to quash the warrant filed herein on the grounds 
that'Section 31-17 of The Code of the·City of Norfolk, 1958, as 
amended, violates the provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and as such 
is invalid and the warrant therefore alleges no offense. 
And the Court, having duly considered said motion, and 
heard the argument and representations of Beril M. Abraham, counsel 
of record for the defendant, and of Mary Keating, Assistant City 
Attorney for the City of Norfolk, and having studied written 
memorandum filed by counsel, 
It is Ordered that the Motion to Quash is denied for 
the reasons stated orally by the Court during such hearing, citing 
as the basis for its ruling the decision of the Supreme Court of · 
Virginia in Collins v. City of Norfolk, 186 Va. 1, as buttressed 
by the decisions of said Court in Hackney v. Commonwe.alth, 186 
Va. 888, and Squire v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 260. To the denial 
of said Motion, the defendant by counsel did object and note his 
exception. 
4 
Trial on the merits will be Tuesday, June 29, 1976, 
in Courtroom 3, Circuit Court, City of Norfolk. 
Seen: 
Enter: 
John W. W~nston 
Judge 
p. d. 
----------------~------------~ 
5 
* * * * 
(TR 11, line 22-25; TR 12) 
MR. ABRAHAM: Secondly, I would respectfu~ly 
renew my motion to quash the warrant for the reasons 
cited to the Court by memorandum and by oral argument 
and point out to the Court that although it did not 
appear in the Court's order, that in deciding the case 
and in the Court's opinion from the bench, the Court, in 
part, relied on the matter of City vs. Flannery, 216 VA 
362 as authority for the Court's holding in sustaining 
the constitutionality of the statute and refusing to grant 
the motion to quash. 
I respectfully point out that Flannery can be 
distinguished from the present case in that Flannery dealt 
with an ordinance of the City Code which prohibited main-
taining and keeping a disorderly house and it was also 
specific, unlike 31.17 as to the acts which it prohibited, 
thereby coming into line and being acceptable under the 
tests set forth in the Squire case. 
We do not believe Flannery would apply to this, 
or that the Virginia Supreme Court would so look at · 
Flannery as to use it as a basis for sustaining the con-
stitutionality of 31.17. 
Flannery was specific as to the acts prohibited.· 
This statute is vague, indefinite, and over broad. 
THE COURT: Mr. Abraham, the oral opinion of 
6 
(TR 12) 
the Court was not recorded, that I recall. The order to 
which you refer does not cite Flannery as the basis for the 
Court's ruling. If the Court recalls correctly, the 
reason that I mentioned Flannery at all was not because it 
upheld the validity of a Norfolk ordinance, making it an 
offense to.frequent a disorderly house, which was a 
common-law-defined crime, but because it seemed to me that 
the Supreme Court of Virginia was extremely careful in 
that opinion to distinguish disorderly house from disorderly 
conduct and not to make a ruling on disorderly conduct 
whatsoever -- perhaps as the foreshadowing to its being 
required to review the validity of a disorderly conduct 
ordinance such as the one that is here today. 
I have·no recollection of using Flannery 
as authority for ruling that Section 31.17 of the City 
Code of Norfolk met and continues to meet the constitutional 
standards required of such a statute, which does not 
constitute a common-law offense. 
In any event, the Court will continue to 
adhere to its previous ruling and again overrule your 
motion to quash the warrant, based upon the lack of 
constitutionality of Section 31.17 of the City Code. 
MR. ABRAHAM: Please note·our objection 
and.exception to the Court's ruling. 
* * * * 
7 
* * * * 
(TR 13) 
1~. KEATING: The City has a brief opening 
statement. 
Your Honor, Mr. Stanley is here today, 
charged with disorderly conduct on a warrant that was 
secured by Walter Hartin, III, as a result of an.incident 
occurring on Hay 19, 1976, about 7:00p.m., outside of the 
apartment building where Mr. Martin lives, on Bute Street 
in Norfolk. 
The City's evidence will show Mr. Martin 
was outside his apartment building, cleaning a fish; and 
Mr. Stanley, who lives in the apartment building next to 
Mr. Martin's, came up to him and told him to leave or 
something to that effect. 
Mr. Martin replied that he had a right to 
remain there and that he would until he finished. 
Mr. Stanley insisted and he used abusive 
language to him in a loud voice, taunted him and cursed 
him and waved his cane at him in a threatening manner. 
Mr. Martin then tried to ignore him, until 
Mr. Stanley threw a block of wood at him from behind him. 
Mr. Stanley then went inside the apartment 
building and got a pool cue and came back out, swung it at 
Mr. Martin wi~~ a heavy hand, in an attempt to strike him. 
At this point, Mr. Martin decided it was 
time to leave and he ran into his apartment building. 
8 
(TR 14) 
The City's evidence will show Mr. Stanley's 
actions were witnessed by Miss Rita Williams, who lives 
in the same apartment building as Mr. Martin, and she will 
testify that she was in her apartment, in her living room. 
She heard loud yelling and abusive language coming from the 
rear of the building, indicating that she recognized 
Mr. Stanley·' s voice and went out to the fire escape to 
look and saw Mr. Stanley threatening someone. ·She did not 
know Mr. Martin at the t.irr.e, but threatening someone with 
his cane and heard statements made by Mr. Stanley. 
She states when the noise died down, she went 
back into her apartment. She thought it was over with 
and later heard more noise and then at that time came· to 
her window and saw Mr. Stanley with what she describes as 
a large stick, attempting to swing and strike him. She 
never djd see who the other person was and did not hear 
any abusive ~anguage from the other person. 
That, in essence, will be the evidence. 
THE COURT: Where did this occur? 
MRS. KEATING: This occurred behind the 
apartment building in the 300 block of Bute Street, where 
Mr. Martin lives. 
THE COURT: Mr. Abraham? 
MR. ABRAHAM: If it please your Honor, Mr. 
Stanley's evidence will show that this incident occurred 
between four and four-fifteen in the afternoon; that 
9 
(TR 15) 
Mr. Stanley had been outside, speaking with the building 
manager; that at that time the building manager left, Mr. 
Stanley turned around and noticed Mr. Martin was cleaning 
fi$h and throwing the entrails and heads onto the pavement 
located directly next to Mr. Stanley's building. 
Mr. Martin lives on the other side of. his 
building, on which there is no driveway; and while there 
are facilities near Mr. Martin's apartment for the cleaning 
of these fish, he was doing it in the driveway on another 
side of his building. 
The building extends approximately a quarter 
of a block. 
Mr. Stanley told Mr. Martin not to throw the 
entrails and the· fish heads onto the pavement there because 
of the unsanitary conditions and because it would draw 
flies and Mr. Martin told Mr. Stanley to mind his own 
business; that one word led to another, and Mr. Martin 
rose with a knife that he was cleaning the fish with and 
began advancing towards Mr. Stanley. 
It was at this stage that Mr. Stanley pointed 
his cane at Mr. Martin and told him not to advance any 
further. A few more words were spoken and Mr. Stanley and 
Mr. Martin both left. 
Our evidence will show at no time did Mr. 
Stanley hurl any object at Mr. Martin. 
THE COURT: Where do you say this occurred? 
_l() 
(TR 16} 
MR. ABRAHAM: This occurred on private 
property, in back of the apartment building in the 300 
block of West Bute Street, in a driveway owned and main-
tained by the apartment management for the use of tenants 
in the building. 
THE COURT: And your client is one of those 
tenants? 
MR. ABRAHAM: Yes, sir .• 
THE COURT: And where is Mr. Martin's apartment 
with relation to these events? 
MR. ABRAHAM: As we will show by photographic 
evidence, your Honor, Mr. Martin's apartment is on the 
other side of his building, away from the driveway, 
approximately a quarter of a block from it. 
THE COURT: Does he have an apartment in 
another building facing onto --
MR. ABRAHAM: Facing onto a court, your Honor. 
* * * * 
(TR 19} A Well, I was behind my apartment 
building. There was a water faucet and I was cleaning fish 
back there. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
At 349 West Bute? 
That • s right. 
Is that in the City of Norfolk? 
Yes, ma • am. 
Go on, please. 
ll. 
(TR 19) A I was bent over, cleaning the fish, 
and Mr. Stanley approached me and told me to make sure I 
put the fish entrails in the garbage can so the cats 
wouldn't get them. And I said, "Why?" 
He said he was trying to get rid of all the 
stray cats. That sounded reasonable enough. 
I asked him who was "we". 
And he said, "Me and Baxter." 
I said, "Really?" 
He said yes, and he seemed to feel a little 
bit intimidated at this point. 
He began to become kind of angry and irate. 
He told me I should take my fish entrails and go back to 
my apartment. And I told him no, that I wasn't going to do 
that. 
* * * * 
(TR 20) He began to become pretty obscene, and he told 
me was going to shoot my ass full of buckshot if I didn't 
get out of there. And I continued what I was doing. 
I was bent over and trying to ignore him at 
the time, and I figured I would just ignore him and he 
would go away. 
He was kind of walking around me. The wall 
was in front of me, and he was behind me. Then he said 
he would stick a butcher knife up my ass if I didn't get 
out; and I told him if he didn't stop threatening me that 
I would call the police. 
1.2 
(TR 20) He said he would call the police and have 
me taken out of the place, the parking lot, and he said, 
"You've got a knife." 
I said, "Where?" 
He said, "Behind you." 
The knife was down on the paper with the fish. 
I went back to what I was doing, and he said he knew what 
I was -- and he was yelling at this point and getting very 
shaky. 
And I said, "Who am I?" 
He said, "You're a goddamn mother-fucking 
hippie from North Carolina." 
And I said, "I've never lived in North 
Carolina~" 
(TR 21) He said,"You're a goddamn liar." 
At this point he walked away from me and now 
I thought, "This is it -- he'll leave me alone." I was 
bent over, cleaning a fish, and I felt a whizzing across 
the top of my head, and then I saw a block of wood that 
had smashed into the cement, and he was standing five 
feet from me, shaking and threatening me and telling me 
to get out of there right now. And I said no. He walked 
away again and went into his apartment building. And I 
went back to what I wa$ doing. 
I didn't see him at first when he came back 
out. He got about halfway from the apartment building 
and me before I saw him. And he had a cue stick in his 
l!J 
(TR 21) 
hand, the heavy end up. He told me to get out immediately. 
He was going to attack me. Ane he did. He swung the cue 
stick at me. 
He looked like he was totally out of control. 
His eyes were very wide and his body was shaking and the. 
muscles in his face were very tense, and I just realized 
that I would have to either attack the man and try to subdue 
him or get out immediately. And I didn't really want to attack 
him, because he obviously was some sort of psychotic; so I 
left quickly; and I left my fish behind and I left the water 
running. 
* * * * 
(TR 31) Q About how far was Mr. Stanley from 
you when all this took place? 
A Varying distances; generally in a 
semi-circle about five feet. 
Q He never got closer to you than five 
feet? 
A That was generally at five feet. 
On two occasions when I rose he was 
within a foot and a half of me. 
Q Was he within a distance that if he 
had wanted to -- he had a cane and he could have struck 
you with the cane? 
A Well, yeah, if I wasn't fast enough 
to get out of the way. 
(TR 31) Q 
A 
Did you have to get out of the way? 
When he struck at me with the pool 
stick, yes, I did. 
Q I'm talking about the cane, before 
you went back to your apartment. 
A He didn't actually try to hit me 
with the cane. He was just swaggering the cane in a 
threatening way. 
(TR 32) 
for a minute. 
Q 
A 
Q 
Using the cane like this1 
Kind of like this. 
(Witness indicating.) 
Mr. Stanley, let me have your cane 
Demonstrate to the Court what he did. 
A He was using it like a pointer, 
trying to emphasize it, like what he was yelling about. 
And occasionally going back like that, and mostly shaking 
it like it was an auxiliary part of his arm or something. 
* * * * 
(TR 42) A It was about quarter of seven in 
the evening. I had started dinner and had gone back into 
the living room, which is at the opposite end from the 
kitchen, and was sitting in the living room when I heard 
this yelling and screaming in the back. 
I immediately jumped up, went out, 
went out to the fire escape which faces the driveway there, 
and there saw Mr. Stanley yelling and screaming and using 
_1_5 
(TR 42) 
abusive language and just waving a cane in his hand. 
I became very frightened and went 
back in and called another neighbor to ask if she had also 
heard what I heard. 
In the meantime, the noise stopped 
and then again it started and I went out again _on the fire 
escape and there saw Mr. Stanley with a long stick and he 
hit at Mr. Martin twice with the stick. He also told him 
to get his garbage out of that court, that if he ever saw 
him in that court again that the next thing it would be 
buckshot in his ass. 
said that? 
(TR 50) 
(TR 51) 
Q That's what he said? Mr. Stanley 
That's correct. 
* * * * 
MR. ABRAHAM: If it please the Court, 
prior to proceeding, I would move to strike 
the City's evidence on the ground that the 
City has not shown that this was conduct 
which took or which happened in a public 
place and I would cite to the Court Section 
1-13.17 of the Code of Virginia, which the 
Court is familiar with because it has already 
been read into the record, but which states 
that a city or any other political subdivision 
of the state shall not make an ordinance 
l(i 
(TR 51} inconsistent with any state statute dealing 
with the same subject. 
Eighteen point two dash four fifteen 
of the Code of Virginia is the State Disorderly 
Conduct Statute, and that statute, in part, 
reads as follows, and I quote: 
11 Any person who shall behave 
in a riotous or disorderly manner 
or cause any unnatural disturbance 
in any street, highway, public 
building, public place, or while in 
or on a public conveyance and any 
person who shall willfully interrupt 
or unnecessarily disturb any meeting 
of the governing body of any political 
subdivision of this state or a sub-
division or agency thereof, or of 
any school, literary society, or 
place of religious worship, or who, 
being intoxicated, shall disturb a 
meeting, whether willfully or not, 
shall be guilty of a Class I mis-
demeanor. 11 
THE COURT: What Section is that? 
MR. ABRAHAM: Eighteen point two dash four 
fifteen of the Code of Virginia, your Honor. 
Again, in pertinent part: 
1. 7 
(TR 52) "The governing body of counties, 
cities and towns are authorized to 
adopt ordinances prohibiting and 
punishing the acts prohibited by this 
section, provided that the punishments 
fixed therefore shall not exceed that 
prescribed for Class I misdemeanors." 
The City Ordinance then, your Honor, must 
remain consistent with the State Statute because 
the State has addressed itself to a given category 
or proscribed conduct. 
The state has specified where that conduct 
must take place in order to come under the 
proscription. Even though the City Ordinance 
makes no mention of an area other than to say, 
"any person who shall within the limits of 
the city be guilty of disorderly conduct --" 
The City may not proscribe conduct in 
places other than those places in which 
the State has addressed its statute to. 
The State specifically limits the pro-
scription to public places. The State has- not 
shown that the area in question was one of 
fuose areas in which the State has sought 
to protect the public by proscribing this 
conduct. 
That is in any street, highway, public 
.18 
{TR 53) 
building, public place or in a public 
conveyance or in a meeting of any governing 
body or political subdivision of the state, 
etcetera, et cetera. In other words, the 
General Assembly says there are certain 
places where given conduct we have enumerated 
shall constitute disorderly conduct. 
The City cannot go beyond these 
places in proscribing conduct. 
Now, the Supreme Court has said they 
can enlarge upon the acts, themselves, but the 
Legislature has limited the locations. 
Consequently, in order not to conflict with 
Section 1-13.17, we would respectfully submit 
that these acts would have had to have taken 
place in an area as specifically mentioned in 
the State Statute. 
THE COURT: What offense, if it was 
an offense -- what offense did Mr. Stanley 
commit if he didn't commit disorderly conduct 
in a public place? 
MR. ABRAHAr~: If he did not commit dis-
orderly conduct, he might be guilty of 
assault if we accept the City's evidence 
at its highest and best value. 
He might be guilty of curse and 
1_9 
(TR 54) abuse, but the City has not elected to charge 
him with these, and the Court cannot charge 
in place of the City. There are specific 
statutes, your Honor, which might cover the 
conduct if we accept Mr. Martin's testimony 
and Mrs. Williams' testimony with no 
reservations, but this is not one of th~m, and 
the personal abuse statute and the assault 
statute which comes from common law and not 
statutory, and they are to be interpreted 
by the Court, certainly could cover the 
conduct that was testified to. 
The City has not elected to 
prosecure under those statutes. It has 
elected to prosecure under a purely 
statutory ofdinance, which the United States 
Supreme Court and the Virginia Supreme Court 
say because the offense he enumerated 
is statutory in nature must be strictly 
construed so they cannot go beyond the 
limits of what the legislature has set out. 
Secondly, your Honor, Mr. Martin's 
conduct, or rather, Mr. Martin's testimony, 
as well as Mrs. Williams' testimony, have 
both indicated to the Court that Mr. Martin 
was not of a nature to engage in violence as 
a result of Mr. Stanley's actions. 
20 
(TR 55) It could be that Mr. Stanley was 
ready to engage in violence as a result of 
Mr. Martin's activity. 
Mr. Martin said he was perturbed 
and that he felt threatened and went back to 
his apartment and Mrs. Williams testified 
she had been frightened. 
Well, the Courts haven't defined 
this as conduct tending toward public 
violence and these people, both, in describing 
their emotions to the Court, and in describing 
the reactions to this man's conduct have 
specifically testified - and Mr. Martin, 
who is the complainant witness specifically 
testified that this kind of conduct would 
not have provoked him into physical activity 
with Mr. Stanley. 
As a matter of fact, when it got 
to the point it became intolerable, he walked 
away from it, so by judicial interpretation 
of disorderly conduct, we do not have an 
act by their own testimony, considering it 
in its most favorable light, that is an 
act which tends toward public violence. 
Both of these people did not 
express the emotion of tending toward 
violence, although other emotions were 
2t 
(TR 56) expressed. We therefore say that on both 
grounds, number one, that the fact they 
have not shown this was in a public place or 
in other areas specified by the General 
1Bsembly or the judicially interpreted 
ground that their emotions did not tend 
toward violence, we say that the City has 
not made its burden of proof. 
THE COURT: Mrs. Keating? 
MRS. KEATING: The City would repeat 
what was said earlier, that the City Statute 
can differ in a minor fashion from the State 
Code. That is on the basis of the Shaw case 
and Judge Guerry has so held recently. 
We also indicate to the Court that 
suggest to the Court that State Statute 16.1-137 
would allow the Court on its own motion to 
amend this warrant to conform to the 
evidence if the Court desires. 
Also, we would repeat that though 
the language of the City Code is different 
from the State Code, the language, "public 
place," in the State Code would indicate any 
place which would be open to the public, 
where the public might go, and there is 
absolutely no evidence that this parking lot 
next to these two apartment buildings, which 
22 
(TR 57) have possibly many people using it, in any way 
is restricted to the public. 
There is no evidence from the 
photographs introduced by Mr. Abraham that 
this is in any way blocked off or chained 
off or any signs indicating that the public 
is not welcome there. 
We would submit to the Court 
that this is, in fact, a public place.within 
the meaning of the State Code Section. 
Mr. Abraham argues that Mr. Martin 
was not provoked to violence by Mr. Stanley's 
actions. Mr. Martin stated that when Mr. Stanley 
swung at him with a pool cue, he knew that 
he either had to somehow subdue or restrain 
Mr. Stanley or exercise self-restraing and 
leave; and that is what he did. He didn't 
walk away, but ran, and left his fish there 
and left the water running. 
Now, Mr. Stanley is lucky that 
Mr. Martin exercised self-restraing. His 
conduct frightened Mrs. Williams. He annoyed 
Mr. Martin and, in fact, Mr. r1artin had not 
left, .he would have had to engage in a fight 
with Mr. Stanley to restrain him, to keep him 
from beating him with a pool cue. 
Mr. Stanley, it seems, did everything 
(TR 59) in his power to provoke Mr. Martin; cursed, 
threatened him~ he threw a block'of wood at 
him. He struck at him with a pool cue. 
It seems that if anyone's conduct would ever 
be considered disorderly or calculated to 
provoke a breach of the peace, then 
Mr. Stanley's conduct in this incident 
would have to be characterized in that manner. 
THE COURT: Mrs. Keating, do you 
contend that the City has the authority to 
pass the disorderly conduct, known in 
section 31-17, such authority being derived 
from the City Charter, or do you say that 
the authority must originate in the specific 
provi~ions of what is currently known as 
State Statute 16.2-415, which does authorize 
governing bodies - cities - to adopt ordinances 
prohibiting and punishing 
MRS. KEATING: It is the City's 
position that the ordinance was pursuant to 
the charter of Norfolk which contains general 
police powers by the General Assembly. 
The current State Code Sections 
would also authorize passage of such acts by 
nunicipal governments, but would perhaps 
authorize it to towns and cities and 
counties which had not previously enacted 
24 
(TR 60') such a statute. 
THE COURT: But it did not have the 
authority because their charter might 
not have an authorization built into it? 
MRS. KEATING: It's Section 2, 
paragraph 25 through 27, or close to those 
sections. I'm not sure specifically which 
ones. 
MR. ABRAHAM: May I address myself 
to the last question that your Honor asked 
Mrs. Keating -- whether or not the authority 
to enact the ordinance came from the State 
Statute or from the City Charter? I would 
say it's irrelevant. 
When the State addresses itself --
when the General Assembly addresses itself 
to the proscription of conduct, regardless 
of where the City of Norfolk gets its 
authority to address itself to that same 
conduct, it's subservient to the General 
Assembly. 
No one in this state -- nobody in 
this state rises higher than the General 
Assembly, pursuant to the Constitution of 
Virginia. 
Norfolk's disorderly conduct could 
have been in effect for 199 years. If this 
·~s ~-
(TR 61) year the General Assembly addresses itself 
to this particular kind. of conduct, then 
what it says controls, regardless of where 
the City of Norfolk got its authority or 
how long its ordinance had been on the books. 
Only the Constitution of Virginia, 
an amendment of the Constitution of Virg~nia, 
making the political subdivision of the 
Ci.ty of Norfolk on the same level with the 
General Assembly could change that. 
Once the General Assembly has 
spoken to the issue, all political 
subdivisions are bound by what it says. 
THE COURT: Norfolk City Ordinance 
Section 31-17 states in part: 
"Any person who shall 
within the limits of the City 
be guilty of disorderly conduct 
shall be fined --" 
and so forth. 
The Court holds that the authority 
extended to the City under its charter by the 
Legislature of Virginia did grant and does 
grant the City the authority to enact the 
disorderly conduct ordinance and to permit 
it to control the conduct of persons at 
any point within the city limits, which the 
2fi 
(TR 62) City has elected to do in the ordinance; 
and therefore, whether the area in question 
is a public or private place is of no 
consequence under that ordinance. 
The Court would further say that 
If Mr. Abraham is correct, that this broad 
authority given to the City in its charter 
by the Legislature has thereafter been 
restricted by the enactment of what is 
currently Section 18.2-415 of the State Code, 
to permit cities to adopt and punish acts 
and conduct prohibited by that section --
that even if the City has now proscribed 
within the limits of a small domain, so to 
speak, as far as disorderly conduct is 
concerned, yet that domain includes riotous 
or disorderly behavior, unnecessary disturbance 
in a street, highway, public building or place, 
in a public conveyance, governing body of a 
political subdivision, school, literary 
society, place of public worship, the Court 
feels that the area where this incident took 
place would be considered a public place, 
regardless of whether it be owned by a 
private person or by the City, since it's a 
public driveway area which is available to 
the various individuals who are tenants of 
I") I .... 
K.( 
(TR 63) the two buildings making up the apartment 
complex in question, since it's available to 
the guests of those occupants of the apartment 
complex. 
Since it's available to the delivery 
of people who come there -- even possibly to the. 
garbage collectors to come there, if there 
be garbage facilities in the back, the 
electrical and gas people who come to read 
the meters, the Court holds that ti1at area 
is a public place for the purpose of this 
ordinance and of the statute Mr. Abraham 
argues controls the limits of the ordinance 
:in question. 
The Court will therefore overrule 
fue Defendant's motion to strike, based on 
grounds of inapplicability of ordinance to 
the place where the events occurred. 
The Court will further hold that 
the evidence that the City has presented 
establishes a conduct on the part of the 
Defendant or seeks to establish conduct on 
fue part of the Defendant which would be a 
breach of the peace and tend to public 
violence. 
Therefore, overrules the motion 
to strike based on the sufficiency of the 
28 
(TR 64) e~idence that the City has presented today. 
(TR 80) 
These are motions to strike based 
on the sufficiency of the case presented by 
the City and is not to suggest that the Court 
has any closed mind or is unwilling to 
listen to the Defendant's explanation or to 
any evidence that he might present on his 
own behalf. 
MR. ABRAHAM: Please note our 
exception to the overruling of the motions. 
THE COURT: All right. 
* * * * 
MRS. KEATING; Your Honor, the City 
submits to the Court that Mr. Stanley's actions in this 
incident constitute disorderly conduct. His actions 
involved threats, taunts, cursing, other violent abusive 
language, as well as assault with a block of wood and a 
pool cue. 
He was loud enough to have been heard by 
another tenant, Mrs. Williams, in a second-floor apartment. 
He did everything that he could think of to bring about 
a violent reaction from Mr. Martin; 
* * * * 
(TR 82) If the Court has ever had a case of 
disorderly conduct, conduct calculated to cause a breach 
of the peace or to invoke a violent reaction, this would 
be disorderly conduct and the City would accordingly ask 
29 
the Court to convict Mr. Stanley. 
* * * * 
(TR 86) The Court has before it conflicting 
testimony, convlicting stores as given by Mr. Walter 
Martin, III, the complaining witness, and by the Defendant, 
James G. Stanley, It is clearly established by the 
testimony of Mr. Martin that the Defendant acted-in a 
disorderly way and that his conduct, his language and 
threats, his use of a walking stick or a pool walking 
stick as the case may be, tended to violence and into a 
breach of the peace. 
* * * * 
(TR 86) The court also has the testimony of Mrs. 
Rita Williams, who so far as the Court can determine, 
has no interest in the outcome of this litigation, has 
no grudge against Mr. Stanley. Mr. Stanley says he has 
never had any trouble with her before. She comes here 
as a disinterested witness and confirms the testimony as 
given by Mr. Martin that the Defendant did act probably 
in passion, but nevertheless in a disorderly way and he 
used abusive and profane language and was waving his cane. 
After a period when the noise stopped 
she observed him waving asstick at Mr. Martin, told him to 
get out of the area, that next time buckshot would be 
used if he didn't, if he came back. 
The Court finds that beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the Defendant has been proven to be guilty 
ao 
of disorderly conduct as charged in City Ordinance 
Section 31"":'17. 
* * * * 
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lltrginia: 
of June 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, on the 
, in the year 1!116 • 
29th 
!!.ciTY. OF. NORFOLK vs James G. Stanley (M757-76) 
.li 
li 
H j• 
\: 
'· I' 
.I 
.. 
Attorney for the city of Norfolk: Mary Keating 
Attorney for the accused: 
· (X) Retained 
Beril M. Abraham 
day 
.1; 
.I: ,, 
MISDEMEANOR TRIAL AND SENTENCING ORDER - NOT GUILTY PLEA 
. 
; 
!: 
This-day came the-Attorney for the City of Norfolk an4 
i; the attorney for the accused, as aforesaid, and came as well the 
lt 
l1 li accused,_ who stands charged of Violation of Section 31-17, of the 
.. 
i: j;Norfolk City Code, to-wit: Disorderly conduct, on a Warrant 
l· ,, 
I' j'appealed from the General District court of the City of Norfolk. 
H 
I! Thereupon the accused by counsel, moved the court for a 
jjcontinuance based upon the non-appearance of William C. Eschert, 
~ . 
Psubpoenad by the accused, which motion, after inquiry by the Cour 
!: 
•• j~and having been fully heard and determined, is overruled, and 
;; 
ij objection and exception noted. I; Whereupon the accused by counsel, 
.: li renewed his motion to quash said Warrant based on grounds previou 
H 
1;1y submitted by Memorandum and previously argued in Court, which 
.. ,, 
;i 
Jimotion, having been fully heard and determined by the court, is 
' / 
::overruled, and objection and exception noted. 
!: 
,, 
Thereupon the accused was arraigned and tendered in 
L person his plea of Not Guilty to the aforesaid Warrant and waived 
. trial by jury, and the whole matter of law and fact was heard by 
; 
the Court, without the intervention of a jury, as provided by law. i 
I 
And, having heard the evidence presented on behalf of the Common- l 
l 
I 
'· I 
wealth, the accused by counsel, moved the court to strike the I 
; Commonwealth's evidence, based on judicial grounds, which motion, I 
~· having been fully heard and determined by the Court, is overruled, f 
r f i ( and exception noted. Thereupon the accused presented evidence, 
), \ 
!.and having heard all the evidence, the accused by counsel, renewed 
li j: 
II • rh~s motion to strike the Commonwealth's evidence, which motion, 
11 
n 
i:having been fully heard and determined by the Court, is overruled, 
! ~ 
1:and exception noted. And the Court, having heard all the evidence 
( !: 
:and argument of counsel, doth find the accused Guilty of Violation 
i 
:·of Section 31-17, of the Norfolk City Code, Disorderly conduct, as 
ij 
h 
':charged in the said city warrant. And the defendant offering or 
:alleging nothing in delay of judgment, it is accordingly the judg-
·• I. • 
. 
i·ment of this Court that the defendant be and he is hereby sentenced; 
;· i 
,. 
~·to confinement in the City Jail for the term of Sixty (60) Days, 
:and fined in the sum of $50.00, execution of jail sentence imposed · I I !i 
:.herein is 
., 
ii 
suspended, conditioned upon the defendant's good behaviorj 
{! 
I. 
:;for 
~I 
if 
the period of One (1) Year, and upon payment of the costs of 
:his prosecution. 
i: 
j; 
1: 
:I Thereupon the defendant by counsel, moved the Court for 
!;a stay of execution and for time in which to apply for a writ of 
,, 
!:error to the foregoing judgment, which motion, having been fully 
., 
i! ,. 
Eheard, is sustained, and the execution of the foregoing.sentence 
i! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
Office of 
:UGH L. STOVALL 
Clerk of the 
Circuit Court 
Norfolk, Virginia 
is hereby postponed for Thirty (30) Days, or until the Supreme 
Court of Virginia shall act on said appeal. Thereupon, on mot: 
.of the defendant by counsel, it is ordered that the transcript 
this trial be made a part of the record of this case. 
And the defendant was allowed to depart pursuant to ~ 
recognizance under which he now is. 
cw_w.w~ 
~HN ;. WINSTON, Judge 
(Case of James G. Stanley - M757-76) 
A COPY, TESTE: HUGH l. STOVALL, CLER:( 
BY: /;fJ~ , D.C. 
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VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
CITY OF NORFOLK, . . 
Plaintiff : 
. 
. 
vs. CR. No. 
JAMES G. STANLEY, . . 
Defendant . . 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
COMES NOW the Defendant, James G. Stanley, Defendant in 
the above-captioned cause, who has heretofore filed his Notice of 
Appeal pursuant to Rule 5:6 of the Rules of Court of the Virginia 
Supreme Court, and now pursuant to said Rule assigns as error the 
following in connection with the judgment entered against him by 
the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk on the 29th day of June, 
1976, in a cause wherein the City of Norfolk was Plaintiff and the 
said James G. Stanley was Defendant: 
1. The Court erred in failing to grant Defendant's moti n 
to quash the warrant sworn out against him on grounds that the 
City Ordinance which the warrant charged the Defendant with violat 
ing was contrary to the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Cons~itution of the United States of America. 
Pursuant to Rule 5:6, it is stated that a transcript of 
the testimony taken at the trial of this matter was recorded by a 
duly sworp court reporter, and that the said transcript is to be 
hereafter filed to be made a part of the record on appeal pursuant 
to Rules 5:8 and 5:9 of the Rules of Court of the Virginia Supreme 
court. 
Beril M. Abraham, p.d. 
401 Plaza One Building 
Norfolk, Virginia 23510 35 
JAMES G. STANLEY 
By------------~~~--~~----------Of Counsel 
CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that a true copy of the foregoing 
Assignments of Error was mailed to Mary Keating,· Esq., Assistant 
City Attorney for 'the City of Norfolk, City Hall Building, Civic 
Center, Norfolk, Virginia 23510, of counsel for Plaintiff, this 
30th day of June, 1976. 
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